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A TALE OF TWO CITIES:
THE RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD'S DUTY TO
MITIGATE IN NEW YORK
JEREMY N. SHEFF *
Ils y doivent travailler devant la majestueuse igalit, des lois, qui
interdit au riche comme au pauvre de coucher sous les ponts, de
mendier dans les rues et de voler du pain.I
INTRODUCTION
The past half century has seen sweeping changes to the legal regime
applicable to the landlord-tenant relationship, particularly for residential
properties.2 As every first-year law student learns, the ancient feudal
conception of a lease as a present transfer of an interest in land has given
way to a more modem understanding of leases as contracts between a
provider of a package of goods and services and their consumer. 3 Among
the changes wrought by this conceptual shift has been the imposition of
previously unknown obligations on landlords in the event of tenant
abandonment. Called either the duty to mitigate or, perhaps more
accurately, the avoidable consequences rule,4 the rule requires a landlord
seeking recovery of damages from a defaulting tenant who has abandoned
possession to establish that he has made reasonable efforts to minimize the
* Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. I am grateful for research
assistance from Christopher Holtz and Maria Martinez. This paper was originally presented at the
Modem Adaptations of Racial, Social, and Economic Justice Symposium Celebrating the 40th
Anniversary of Ronald H. Brown's Graduation from St. John's School of Law, hosted by the Ronald
H. Brown Center for Civil Rights and Economic Development and the St. John's Journal of Civil
Rights and Economic Development. Special thanks to Professors Leonard Baynes and Janai Nelson for
organizing the symposium.
1 ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE 118 (Calmann-Levy ed., 1896) (1894).
2 See generally Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes
and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 517, 520-21 (1984) (discussing the revolution of landlord-
tenant law, specifically referencing back to 1968).
3 See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (1970).
4 Stephanie G. Flynn, Duty to Mitigate Damages Upon a Tenant's Abandonment, 34 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 721, 723-24 (2000) ("A more accurate phrase that has been suggested for the duty to
mitigate is the 'avoidable consequences rule').
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damages flowing from the tenant's abandonment, for example by
attempting to re-let the abandoned property.5 This is a departure from the
traditional rule that a landlord could, if he chose, allow property abandoned
by a tenant during the term of a lease to sit vacant and idle, and still hold
the tenant liable for the full rent due under the lease for the entire term
thereof.6 One recent survey reports that the District of Columbia and all
but six states have adopted this rule by statute or judicial decision in the
four decades since it first entered the American legal landscape.7
New York has been a studied exception to this trend. For decades, the
lower courts in the state have variously imposed and rejected the landlord's
duty to mitigate, at least in the context of residential leases. 8 This unsettled
situation came to an apparent end in the summer of 2008, when the
Appellate Division, Second Department, of the New York Supreme Court
handed down its decision in the case of Rios v. Carrillo.9 That case,
extending the no-mitigation rule reaffirmed by the Court of Appeals with
respect to commercial leases in Holy Properties, Ltd. v. Kenneth Cole
Productions, Inc.,10 sided with those lower courts that had held that
residential landlords have no duty to mitigate, and in so doing, effectively
imposed the traditional no-mitigation rule statewide for the foreseeable
future.11
5 See generally Glen Weissenberger, The Landlord's Duty to Mitigate Damages on the Tenant's
Abandonment: A Survey of Old Law and New Trends, 53 TEMP. L. Q. 1, 1-3 (1980) (summarizing the
evolution of the law that has led up to the treatment of leases as "agreement(s] between [I merchant[s]
and [] consumer[s] for goods and services").
6 Flynn, supra note 4, at 780-81 ("In the states that adhere to the non-mitigation rule . . . the
landlord may (1) terminate the lease, thereby releasing the tenant from the further obligation to pay rent,
(2) obtain another tenant and hold the original tenant liable for any deficiency that occurs (i.e.,
mitigation), or (3) allow the premises to remain vacant and collect the remaining rent from the original
tenant. A fourth option has been suggested by scholarly commentators: accepting a substitute tenant
proposed by the original tenant." (footnotes omitted)).
7 Joshua R. Cohn, Effecting a "Petrifying Rigidity": Why New York, Under Certain
Circumstances, Needs to Impose a Duty to Mitigate on Residential Landlords in the Event of Tenant
Abandonment 24-25 (2010) (unpublished scholarly note, St. John's University School of Law) (on file
with author).
8 The New York Court of Appeals rejected the duty to mitigate rule in the context of commercial
leases in Holy Properties Ltd., L.P. v. Kenneth Cole Productions., Inc., 637 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1995). This
was the Court of Appeals' first pronouncement on the issue since its decision over a hundred years
earlier in Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518 (1876), a case that unsurprisingly applied the traditional rule to a
residential lease. Lower court cases addressing the residential landlord's duty to mitigate are discussed
further infra at notes 13-21 and the accompanying text.
9 861 N.Y.S.2d 129 (N.Y App. Div.-2d 2008) (extending the no-mitigation rule for commercial
leases to residential leases).
10 87 N.Y.2d 130, 134 (1995) (distinguishing the no-mitigation rule as an exception to the general
contract law duty to mitigate in the event of a breach).
11 See Cohn, supra note 7, at 22 n.95 (noting that tenants who abandon leases for lack of funds are
unlikely to have the resources to put their case before the Court of Appeals).
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This Article argues that the Rios decision is worthy of criticism, but not
because imposing a duty to mitigate on landlords is necessarily the best
rule for every dispute arising out of a residential tenant's abandonment.
Rather, Rios is bad law because it is the product of an unfortunate
confluence of a poorly framed legal issue, a poorly organized judicial
hierarchy, and an economically diverse jurisdiction.12 Rather than argue the
merits of the traditional or modem positions on the legal question of
landlord mitigation in the abstract, this Article argues that courts in New
York have traditionally responded to residential tenant abandonment by
weighing the equities and the good faith of the parties in each case, and that
they should continue to do so. Rios forecloses this type of factually
sensitive inquiry on the part of trial courts, creating incentives for
undesirable strategic behavior by landlords.
To be fair, the duty to mitigate imposed in many jurisdictions creates
incentives for strategic behavior by tenants, though such jurisdictions
appear to have made the policy judgment that such behavior is either less
likely or less harmful than strategic behavior by landlords under the
traditional rule. But the experience of New York in this area suggests that
by tolerating a modicum of discretion on the part of judges, a jurisdiction
may be able to discourage-or at least decline to reward-strategic
behavior of any kind in residential landlord-tenant relationships.
Moreover, such judicial discretion allows for more sensitive balancing of
the policy issues at stake in residential landlord-tenant relationships, which
are highly dependent on the economic circumstances of particular landlords
and tenants. In a jurisdiction like New York, which is home to stunning
economic diversity, the argument in favor of flexible standards rather than
bright-line rules on economically contingent issues such as residential
tenant abandonment is particularly strong.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I analyzes the cases in this area of
landlord-tenant law and identifies trends in the doctrine leading up to the
decision in Rios-chief among them a sensitivity of courts to the particular
equities of the parties before them-and situates Rios as a natural result of
these trends. Part II discusses the features of the New York Unified Court
System that allow Rios, while consistent with pre-existing trends in the
caselaw, to upend those trends and eliminate the equitable sensitivity that
has characterized residential tenant abandonment cases in New York. Part
12 Whether the Rios court's invocation of Holy Properties as precedent was appropriate is yet
another point on which the opinion can be criticized. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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III demonstrates the likely effects of this shift in the law by reference to
demographic data on housing characteristics in the downstate region. In
particular, the diversity of housing stock and the economic positions of
landlords and tenants in this region suggests that the equitable flexibility
that characterized the tenant abandonment cases prior to Rios was
desirable, and that the features of the New York court system that allowed
Rios to disrupt this flexibility are undesirable. Part IV concludes with a
critique of Rios, not simply as a wrongly decided case (which it arguably
was in terms of its legal analysis), but as an example of how things can go
wrong in a common-law system of adjudication.
I. LANDLORD-TENANT DISPUTES: EQUITABLE WEIGHING OR BRIGHT-LINE
RULES?
A review of the history of the issue of landlord mitigation in New York's
lower courts prior to Rios helps to identify some of the concerns that appear
to motivate courts in cases of residential tenant abandonment.
The duty to mitigate appears to be a judicial response to the economic
stresses of modem urban living.13 Unsurprisingly then, in New York,
where the applicability of the rule has been uncertain, 14 courts have been
13 See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (D.C. Cir. 1970):
The assumption of landlord-tenant law, derived from feudal property law, that a lease primarily
conveyed to the tenant an interest in land may have been reasonable in a rural, agrarian society ...
But in the case of the modem apartment dweller, the value of the lease is that it gives him a place
to live .... The complexities of city life, and the proliferated problems of modem society in
general, have created new problems for lessors and lessees . . ." Some courts have realized that
certain of the old rules of property law governing leases are inappropriate for today's transactions.
quoting RICHARD POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 221 (1967). See also Paragon Indus., Inc. v.
Williams, 473 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (App. Term-2d 1983) (citing Javins and imposing a duty to
mitigate on residential landlords).
14 This qualification excludes cases in which a particular rule was treated as directly applicable and
binding precedent. Thus, it excludes cases that mechanically follow the no-mitigation rule of Holy
Properties without discussion of the distinction between residential and commercial leases. See, e.g.,
Callender v. Titus, 791 N.Y.S.2d 868, 868 (App. Term-2d 2004); Solow Mgmt. Corp. v. Lovelace, N.Y.
L.J., June 28, 2000, at 27 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County); Commuter Hous. Co. v. Saunders, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 11,
2000, at 35 (N.Y. App. Term-2d 2000); McMorrow v. Dorian, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 23, 1998, at 37 (N.Y.
App. Term-2d). Conversely, it also excludes cases which mechanically follow the pro-mitigation rule of
Paragon without discussing Holy Properties or Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518 (1876). See, e.g., Palumbo
v. Donalds, 754 N.Y.S.2d 856, 866 (Civ. Ct. Kings County 2003); Richard G. Roseetti, LLC v.
Werther, 800 N.Y.S.2d 355, 355 (City Ct. Albany 2005). Also excluded from the analysis in this
section are cases in which the duty to mitigate was not directly at issue. See, e.g., Wallis v. Falken-
Smith, 523 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (App. Div.-1st 1988); Birchwood Assocs. v. Stem, 390 N.Y.S.2d 505,
506 (App. Term-2d 1976) in which landlords' diligent efforts to relet the premises moot the question of
whether they had a duty to do so. See also Grays v. Brooks, 561 N.Y.S.2d 515, 516 (Civ. Ct. Queens
County 1990) in which the court found that the landlord had a duty to mitigate, even after the decision
in Becar, because the tenant vacated after service of a warrant of eviction.
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more likely to impose a duty to mitigate on residential landlords in urban
settings than in non-urban settings, but less likely to do so where the rental
property at issue might be characterized as a luxury property. So, for
example, a duty to mitigate was found in cases involving a moderately
priced apartment in the Belmont section of the Bronx, 15 an inexpensive
apartment in Queens,16 and a rent-stabilized apartment in the Borough Park
section of Brooklyn.17 In contrast, landlords were not expected to mitigate
damages in cases involving a high-rise apartment in the affluent Turtle Bay
section of Manhattan's East Side,1 8 an over-$9,000-per-month rental home
in the waterfront community of Kings Point in Nassau County,19 a
suburban home in Webster (a suburb of Rochester), 20 or a weekly rental of
a vacation cottage in the Finger Lakes. 21
15 29 Holding Corp. v. Diaz, 775 N.Y.S.2d 807, 814 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2004). The leased
premises in Diaz were located at 707 East 187th Street in Bronx County, and the monthly rent-
according to the landlord's claim for 12 months' unpaid rent from April 1997 to May 1998, totaling
$6963.84-was approximately $580-roughly equivalent to $776 in 2010. See Diaz, 775 N.Y.S.2d at
810; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR (2010), http://www.bls.gov/
data/inflation calculator.htm. According to the most recent census data available as of this writing, the
median rent in this section of the Bronx is currently $782. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2007-2009
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 3-YEAR ESTIMATES: PUBLIC USE MICRODATA AREA 5 03705, NEW
YORK: SELECTED HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS: 2007-2009, available at http://factfinder2.census.gov.
16 Parkwood Realty Co. v. Marcano, 353 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Civ. Ct. Queens County. 1974). The
apartment at issue was rented for $175 per month in 1973, roughly equivalent to $845 in 2009. See id,
353 N.Y.S.2d at 627; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR (2010),
http://www.bls.gov/datalinflation calculator.htm. According to the most recent census data, the median
rent in Queens County is currently $1,136. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2006-2008 AMERICAN COMMUNITY
SURVEY 3-YEAR ESTIMATES: QUEENS COUNTY, NEW YORK: SELECTED HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS:
2006-2008, available at http://factfinder2.census.gov.
17 Lora Equities, Inc. v. Galindo, 821 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Civ. Ct. Kings County 2006). The regulated
monthly rent in the case was $645.86. Id. at 378.
18 Whitehouse Estates, Inc. v. Post 662 N.Y.S.2d 982 (App. Term-lst 1997) (involving a dispute
over an apartment at 350 East 52nd Street in Manhattan); cf C.J. Hughes, Living in Turtle Bay: In the
Many Enclaves, One Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/03/30/realestate/30livi.html (noting that in early 2008 one-bedroom apartments in Turtle Bay
rented for around $3,200 per month). The opinion in Whitehouse Estates does not disclose the amount
of rent agreed to under the lease at issue.
19 Gordon v. Eshagoff, No. 6246-04, 2007 WL 2815546, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau County Sept. 04,
2007) (the rent was $9,450 from September 2005 - July 2006 and $9,925 from July 2005 - July 2006).
20 Wienecke v. Evans, 15 Misc.3d 1128(A), 841 N.Y.S.2d 222, 2007 WL 1240413, at *4 (Just. Ct.
Town of Webster Apr. 30, 2007). In Wienecke the court rejected an argument that Holy Properties and
similar Fourth Department precedent should be read to apply only to commercial leases. Id. at *3.
21 Spohn v. Fine, 479 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (County Ct. Yates County 1984). The litigation in Spohn
originated in the small claims part of the town court of Jerusalem, New York, in Yates county, the heart
of the Finger Lakes region. The court in Spohn felt bound by stare decisis to follow an ancient Court of
Appeals case on the question of a landlord's duty to mitigate, but acknowledged the growing body of
precedent in the Second Department departing from this rule. Id at 140-41.
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Equitable considerations also appear to strongly influence the choice of
rule in disputes implicating landlord mitigation. Such considerations may
include the economic hardship faced by the parties, their relative
sophistication, and their record of good faith. For example, in Duda v.
Thompson,22 the landlord was an individual who, along with a partner, has
held an interest in several small properties in Westchester County over the
past thirty years. 23 The defendant, a tenant in a two-family dwelling in
Yonkers at which the plaintiff apparently also resided for at least some
time,24 remained in occupation for three months without paying rent,
contested the suit subsequently brought by the landlord, and then vacated
the leased premises in secret. Defendant did not notify the landlord of his
departure until nearly two months after the fact when directly asked by the
presiding justice more than a month after dispositive motions had been
fully briefed.25 The court held that the aggrieved landlord had no duty to
mitigate, noting that the same rule had been applied in Becar where the
tenant's breach was the result of his death prior to the start of the lease
term-apparently contrasting the equitable implications of circumstances
outside of the tenant's control in Becar with those of the defendant's
deliberate acts in Duda.26
In Lefrak v. Lambert,27 the court found a duty to mitigate in sharply
different circumstances. The plaintiff in Lefrak was "one of the largest (if
not The largest) individual owner of residential apartment houses" in New
York City, who demanded relief under an apparently punitive liquidated
damages clause and made no showing of specific efforts to re-let the
apartment in question-one in a complex of five thousand-instead relying
on the inclusion of the apartment on an "availability list" for the 17 months
22 647 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1996).
23 Westchester Records Online, Land Records Search for Carol Duda, executed on September 14,
2010 (search results on file with author).
24 See Duda, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 404-05 (noting that ancillary proceedings could be brought in
Yonkers City Court); Deed dated September 1, 1987, Westchester County Clerk's Office Liber 8965
Page 122 (on file with author) (listing Carol A. Duda as residing at an address corresponding to the only
parcel in the city of Yonkers in which she has a recorded interest). Ms. Duda and her partner sold the
property in 1999, some three years following the decision of their suit against their tenant, Mr.
Thompson. Deed dated August 24, 1999, Westchester County Clerk's Office Liber 12387 Page 113 (on
file with author). A search for the property address (not listed here for privacy purposes) on Google
Maps reveals it to be one of several structures in what appears to be a subdivision of two-family
dwellings.
25 Duda, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
26 Id. at 403.
27 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1976).
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it remained vacant.28 The defendant tenants who benefited from this ruling
were a middle-class couple who had timely notified the landlord that they
were forced to abandon their apartment due to the simultaneous birth of a
child and loss of the mother's income. Appearing pro se, the defendants
offered no defense at trial and agreed to pay "any Fair amount decided
upon," despite the fact that the rent due for their period of actual occupancy
was covered by their security deposit and a post-abandonment payment.29
As the Lefrak court noted, the question of mitigation in tenant
abandonment cases "test[s] the mettle of a judge's ability to live up to th[e]
time-honored precept" of Mosaic law: "Thou shalt not respect the person of
the poor, nor favour the person of the mighty. . . ."30 The cases discussed
above seem to suggest that New York courts in residential abandonment
cases have been cheating on this test. Framing their opinions as part of a
live debate over the selection of an appropriate bright-line legal rule, the
judges in these cases seem to be obscuring-perhaps unintentionally-a
deeper equitable inquiry. At the core of this equitable inquiry is a moral
judgment concerning who ought to bear the costs of tenant abandonment in
a particular case. Notably, this inquiry appears to weigh not only the
moral culpability of the parties' conduct, but also each party's ability to
bear the costs of abandonment, as reflected by their relative economic
might.31
In light of these trends in the application of a duty to mitigate on
residential landlords,32 the outcome of Rios is unsurprising. The apartment
at issue in Rios was a condominium unit in a luxury high rise on East 7 9 1h
Street in Manhattan. 33 The landlord, Maria Rios, owned the individual unit
28 Lefrak, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 960-61 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29 Id. at 960.
30 Idat 960 (quoting Leviticus 19:15).
31 This tendency is not particular to the New York courts. The case with which most first-year law
students are introduced to the landlord's duty to mitigate, Sommer v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767 (N.J. 1977),
reprinted as abridged in JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 410 (6"' ed. 2006), involves parties in
similarly powerful equitable circumstances: the tenant, a returning veteran who was unable to take
possession due to the breakup of his engagement, and the landlord, an owner of a large apartment
complex who declined to respond to the tenant's timely notice of abandonment and refused to re-let the
apartment to a suitable substitute tenant.
32 Of course, the occasional case defies these trends. See, e.g., Kabushi Kaysha Iwasa Tekkojo v.
Comico Entm't, Inc., N.Y. L.J., Apr. 16, 1997, at 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (finding a duty to
mitigate in a dispute over a "luxury duplex condominium apartment" in midtown Manhattan being
leased to celebrity comedian Jackie Mason).
33 The apartment in Rios sold in August of 2010 for $1.15 million. AUTOMATED CITY REGISTER
INFORMATION SYSTEM [hereinafter "ACRIS"] Doc. ID # 2010081600549003, available at http://a836-
acris.nyc.gov/.
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as an investment property, and actually made her home in Westchester.34
Ms. Rios's tenant, Mr. Carrillo, was paying $3,500 per month in rent, and
in a declining market he apparently tried to walk away from the lease to
take a better deal on another apartment in the same building. 35 Claiming
she hoped to sell the apartment, Ms. Rios opted not to re-let it so it could be
more easily shown to prospective purchasers. 36 Based on the judicial
tendencies discussed above, it should be no surprise that the Rios court
found no duty to mitigate on these facts: the landlord is an individual
investor rather than an institution; the property, while urban, is a luxury
property; and the facts before the court suggested the tenant acted in bad
faith.37 The trends identified above would have predicted the outcome in
Rios even in the absence of a clear and consistent rule regarding a
landlord's duty to mitigate. As such, framing the issue as the choice and
application of a "rule" rather than a weighing of the equities adds little
interpretive value, and may actually invite error by obscuring the
determinative issues in play. 38
If the effects of the decision in Rios were limited to the parties to the
action, casting a weighing of equities as the application of a legal rule
would be of little moment. But because of the hierarchy of the New York
court system, this idiosyncratic case is no longer limited to the particular
equities presented by its facts. Precisely because the duty to mitigate is
34 ACRIS, supra note 33, Doc. ID # FT_1640008794564; Interview with Peter Piddoubny, counsel
to Maria Rios, October 23, 2009. The fact that neither party to the case resided in Queens County calls
the propriety of venue in the case into question, see Friedman v. Law 400 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (App.
Div.-2d 1978) (ruling that place of business does not constitute residence for purposes of determining
proper venue), but Mr. Carrillo never contested venue.
35 Brief of Appellant at 1, Rios v. Carrillo, No. 2007-00058 (N.Y. App. Div.-2d June 20, 2007);
Interview with Peter Piddoubny, counsel to Maria Rios, October 23, 2009.
36 Interview with Peter Piddoubny, counsel to Maria Rios, October 23, 2009. Ms. Rios did in fact
sell the unit shortly before the end of Mr. Carillo's lease term. Compare Deed dated August 12, 2002,
ACRIS, supra note 33, Doc. ID # FT_1640008794564; with Brief of Appellant at 1, Rios v. Carrillo,
No. 2007-00058 (N.Y. App. Div.-2d June 20, 2007) (noting that the lease at issue did not expire until
August 14, 2002); Rios v. Carrillo, 861 N.Y.S.2d 129, 130 (App. Div.-2d 2008) (noting that Ms. Rios
filed suit in 2003).
37 The fact that Ms. Rios apparently entered, contracted to sell, and conveyed title to the apartment
during the unexpired term of Mr. Carrillo's lease, and still sought to recover the full rent due for that
term, might call her own good faith into question. However, to the extent the Appellate Division panel
was aware of these facts, its decision to remand for a determination of the factual question whether Ms.
Rios had accepted Mr. Carrillo's surrender of the premises may demonstrate the court's determination
to consider the parties' good faith under a doctrine other than the duty to mitigate, at least in this case.
Rios, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
38 See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (critiquing the legal reasoning of the Rios
opinion).
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framed as a rule rather than an equitable balancing test, Rios will now
govern the rights and duties of landlords and tenants in all cases of tenant
abandonment in New York State, regardless of whether parties in such
cases stand in the same equitable position as the parties in Rios. As the
cases discussed above demonstrate, this precedent will work a significant
change in the relationships between residential landlords and tenants in the
state. An examination of New York's judicial hierarchy will demonstrate
the causes and extent of this shift.
II. A TALE OF Two COURTS: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SUBJECT-MATTER
AND AMOUNT-IN-CONTROVERSY JURISDICTION
The complexity of New York's court system likely contributed to the
uncertainty of the state's rule on residential landlords' duty to mitigate, and
the duration of that uncertainty. A claim for rent against a residential
tenant who has abandoned possession could follow no less than six possible
tracks through the New York court system:
1. If the total unpaid rent due under the lease exceeds $25,000, the
landlord would bring suit in Supreme Court;39 appeal could be
taken as of right to the appropriate department of the Appellate
Division;40 discretionary appeal could then be taken to the Court of
Appeals. 41
2. In the five boroughs of New York City, if the total unpaid rent
due under the lease is $25,000 or less, the landlord would bring suit
in the New York City Civil Court; appeal could be taken as of right
to the appropriate Appellate Term;42 discretionary appeal could
then be taken to the appropriate Department of the Appellate
Division,43 and then again to the Court of Appeals. 44
3. In Nassau and western Suffolk Counties, if the total unpaid rent
due under the lease exceeds $15,000 and is no more than $25,000,
39 N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 7.
40 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5701(a) (Consol. 2011).
41 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5602(a)(1) (Consol. 2011).
42 N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 202 (Consol. 2011) (establishing the $25,000 cap on the court's
jurisdiction); N.Y. CITY Civ. CT. ACT § 1702 (Consol. 2011) (providing the right to appeal to the
Appellate Term).
43 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5703(a) (Consol. 2011).
44 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5602(b)(2) (Consol. 2011).
20 11] 68 1
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the landlord would bring suit in County Court; 45 appeal could be
taken as of right to the Appellate Term for the 90' and 10 th Judicial
Districts; 46 discretionary appeal could then be taken to the
appropriate Department of the Appellate Division,47 and then again
to the Court of Appeals.48
4. In Nassau and western Suffolk Counties, if the total unpaid rent
due under the lease is $15,000 or less, the landlord would bring suit
in District Court;49 appeal could be taken as of right to the
Appellate Term for the 9 h and 10 th Judicial Districts;50 discretionary
appeal could then be taken to the appropriate Department of the
Appellate Division, 51 and then again to the Court of Appeals. 52
5. Outside of New York City, Nassau County, and western Suffolk
County, if the total unpaid rent due under the lease exceeds $15,000
45 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 11(a) ("The county court shall have jurisdiction over ... actions and
proceedings for the recovery of money ... where the amount sought to be recovered or the value of the
property does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars . . . .").
46 See N.Y. SUP. CT. R. §730.1(d)(2)(iii) (Consol. 2011) ( "[T]he Appellate Term ... shall have
jurisdiction to hear and determine all appeals . .. in civil matters, from any county court within either
the ninth judicial district or the tenth judicial district.").
47 See N.Y. C.P.L.R § 5703(a) (Consol. 2011) ("An appeal may be taken to the appellate division,
from an order of the appellate term which determines an appeal from a judgment or order of a lower
court, by permission of the appellate term or, in the case of refusal, of the appellate division.").
48 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5602(a)(1) (Consol. 2011) ("An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals
by permission of the appellate division granted before application to the court of appeals, or by
permission of the court of appeals upon refusal by the appellate division or upon direct application....
Such appeal may be taken in an action originating in ... a county court . . . .").
49 See N.Y. Const. art. VI, §16 (providing authority for the continuation and establishment of
district courts); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 202 (Consol. 2011) ("The court shall have jurisdiction
of actions and proceedings for the recovery of money . . . where the amount sought to be recovered ...
does not exceed S 15,000."); DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 20 (4th ed. 2005) (There are
two district courts in the state, one covering Nassau County and the other the western part of Suffolk
County.").
50 See N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1701 (Consol. 2011) ("Appeals in civil cases shall be taken
from the district court to the county court, unless an appellate term of the supreme court has been
established by the appellate division of the department and such appellate division has directed that
such appeals be taken to such term, in which case the appeal shall be taken to the appellate term.");
N.Y. SUP. CT. R. § 730.1(d)(2)(i) (Consol. 2011) ("Appellate Term shall have jurisdiction to hear and
determine all appeals from the District Court of Nassau County [and] the District Court of Suffolk
County. .. .").
51 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5703(a) (Consol. 2011) ( "An appeal may be taken to the appellate division,
from an order of the appellate term which determines an appeal from a judgment or order of a lower
court, by permission of the appellate term or, in the case of refusal, of the appellate division.").
52 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5602(b)(2) (Consol. 2011) ("An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals
by permission of the appellate division . . . in an action originating in a court other than the supreme
court, a county court, a surrogate's court, the family court, the court of claims or an administrative
agency.").
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and is no more than $25,000, the landlord would bring suit in
County Court; 53 appeal could be taken as of right to the appropriate
department of the Appellate Division; 54 discretionary appeal could
then be taken to the Court of Appeals. 55
6. Outside of New York City, Nassau County, and western Suffolk
County, if the total unpaid rent due under the lease is no more than
$15,000, the landlord would bring suit in City, Town, or Village
Court; 56 appeal could be taken as of right to the County Court; 57
and again as of right to the appropriate Department of the Appellate
Division, 58 discretionary appeal could then be taken to the Court of
Appeals. 59
The most obvious feature of this complex set of litigation paths is the
two-tiered system of jurisdiction it creates based on the amount-in-
controversy. Cases with the highest stakes will originate in Supreme Court
and be appealed to the Appellate Division in the first instance; cases with
lower stakes will originate in a court of limited original jurisdiction and be
appealed to an inferior appellate court; they can only reach the Appellate
Division through discretionary review. But this tiered system of judicial
administration based on amount-in-controversy exists alongside another
53 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 11(a) ("The county court shall have jurisdiction over ... actions and
proceedings for the recovery of money ... where the amount sought to be recovered or the value of the
property does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars . . . ."); but see DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK
PRACTICE § 14 (4th ed. 2005) ("The practitioner should inquire about which categories of jurisdiction
the county court in a particular county customarily exercises. It may be found that in a given county the
court is used primarily as the felony court, while civil matters are brought in the Supreme Court. These
are administrative variations one meets notwithstanding that the court may technically have jurisdiction
over a range of things.").
54 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5701(a) (Consol. 2011) ("An appeal may be taken to the appellate division
as of right in an action, originating in the supreme court or a county court").
55 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5602(a)(1) (Consol. 2011) ("An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals
by permission of the appellate division granted before application to the court of appeals, or by
permission of the court of appeals upon refusal by the appellate division or upon direct application ....
Such appeal may be taken in an action originating in . . . a county court. . . .").
56 N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 202 (Consol. 2011) (setting amount-in-controversy limit in City
Court at $15,000); N.Y. UNIFORM JUST. CT ACT § 202 (Consol. 2011) (establishing amount-in-
controversy limit for Justice Courts (Town and Village Courts) at $15,000).
57 N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 1701 (Consol. 2011) (providing for appeal from City Court to
County Court where no Appellate Term has been established); N.Y. UNIFORM JUST. CT. ACT §1701
(providing for appeal from Justice Courts to County Court where no Appellate Term has been
established).
58 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5703(b) (Consol. 2011) ("An appeal may be taken to the appellate division as
of right from an order of a county court or a special term of the supreme court which determines an
appeal from a judgment of a lower court.").
59 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5602(b)(2) (Consol. 2011).
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tiered system of administration: one based on subject-matter specialization.
The vast majority of residential landlord-tenant matters are allocated to
particular courts throughout the state. This owes largely to the fact that the
procedural mechanism for most such disputes is the summary proceeding
established by Article 7 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings
Law.60 The Housing Part of the New York City Civil Court has exclusive
jurisdiction over such proceedings within the five boroughs of New York
City, regardless of the amount in controversy on ancillary monetary
claims. 61 Outside of the City of New York the courts with original
jurisdiction over summary proceedings are also the courts of limited
amount-in-controversy jurisdiction. 62 In short, judicial specialization in and
expertise with residential landlord-tenant disputes is concentrated in the
courts whose amount-in-controversy jurisdiction is at the lower end of the
spectrum.
A notable exception to this allocation of jurisdiction in residential
landlord-tenant cases based on subject matter is a claim for purely
monetary relief, such as an action for rent against a tenant not in
possession. Because possession is not at issue in such cases, the summary
proceeding is not available 63 and original jurisdiction over such a dispute
will be based solely on the amount in controversy. Of course, this is
precisely the circumstance in which the existence of a landlord's duty to
mitigate damages would be relevant.
In most instances, the exception will make no difference; residential
rents are low enough, and lease terms short enough, that it will be very
unusual for a residential lease to meet the amount-in-controversy threshold
necessary to put it on litigation path 1 or 5 above. But unusual does not
mean impossible, and an action for rent against the abandoning tenant of an
extremely expensive residence is perhaps the only type of residential
landlord-tenant dispute that is likely to originate in Supreme Court (or, in
upstate counties, County Court) and come before the Appellate Division on
an appeal as of right. An exploration of the demographics of housing in
60 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 701 et seq. (Consol. 2011).
61 N.Y. CITY Civ. CT. ACT §§ 110, 204 (Consol. 2011).
62 See supra notes 45, 49 & 56 for the amount-in-controversy limits for County Court, District
Court and Justice Courts, respectively.
63 Landlords may only bring two types of claims in the Housing Part-nonpayment and holdover
proceedings-and because both are summary proceedings relying on special statutory remedies for
recovery of possession, they are not available where the tenant is not in possession. N.Y. CITY CIV. CT.
ACT § Il0(a)(5); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW art. 7 (Consol. 2011). For the same reason, the summary
proceeding is not available against a tenant no longer in possession anywhere else in the state.
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New York demonstrates just how unusual such a case would be.
FIGURE 1: MEDIAN MONTHLY HOUSING COSTS FOR RENTAL
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Figure 1 shows median monthly housing costs for each county in the
First and Second Departments, as well as the statewide median. The
horizontal line represents the amount-in-controversy limit for the courts of
limited original jurisdiction-$25,000--divided by 24-to represent the
distribution of the amount in controversy over a 24-month lease. As the
chart demonstrates, in most downstate counties the median tenant could
only be sued in Supreme Court if he signed a two-year lease and never took
possession. In fact, in the Bronx and Brooklyn, even the tenant who never
took possession under a two-year lease could not, at median rents, injure
his landlord in excess of the jurisdictional limits of the Civil Court.
Moreover, as suggested by the fact that the statewide median is
significantly lower than the median in the downstate counties within the
First and Second Departments, median monthly housing costs in most
64 Data compiled from the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey ("ACS"). U.S.
Census Bureau, 2006-2008 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates, http://factfinder.census.
gov/servet/GCTTable?_bm=y&-context-gct&-ds-name=ACS_2008_3YRGOO_&-CONTEXT=gct&-
mt name=ACS 2008 3YR GOOGCT2514 ST2T&-tree id=3308&-redoLog-true&-
geo id=04000US36&-format=ST-2T&-_lang-en.
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upstate counties are typically far lower than those in most of the downstate
counties, 65 making it even less likely for a tenant abandonment case in
upstate counties to originate in Supreme Court. And in the common
situation of a one-year residential lease, it will be extremely rare to exceed
the jurisdictional limits of the inferior trial courts in any county-the
corresponding horizontal line would literally be off the chart in Figure 1.
In short, simply by virtue of demographics and amount-in-controversy
limits, the residential landlord-tenant case that originates in Supreme Court
and is appealable as of right to the Appellate Division is, by definition, an
outlier. Of course, Rios is exactly such a case-the monthly rent due under
the lease in Rios ($3,500) is also too high to be captured by the scale in
Figure 1.
This idiosyncrasy of Rios is especially significant in light of the weight
accorded to appellate precedent in the courts of New York State. Within
the City of New York, the Appellate Term will hear appeals regarding
residential landlord-tenant disputes, with the exception of suits against
abandoning tenants of extremely expensive residences. 66 The same will be
true for most of Long Island. 67 Elsewhere in the state, the County Courts
will have appellate jurisdiction over most such cases and original
jurisdiction over the remainder. 68 Despite the depth of experience of these
inferior appellate courts in residential landlord-tenant disputes, the weight
of their authority is quite limited. Precedent of the Appellate Term binds
only courts subject to their direct revieW69-notably excluding the Supreme
Court, which is free to disagree with Appellate Term precedent. 70
Conversely, the Appellate Division is treated as a single state-wide court
divided into geographic departments merely for administrative
65 See generally U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 64.
66 N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT §§ 204, 1702 (Consol. 2011).
67 N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT §§ 204, 1701 (Consol. 2011).
68 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 11(a); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1701 (Consol. 2011).
69 People v. Garcia, 870 N.Y.S.2d 851, 856 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2008) (explaining that the
opinions of the Appellate Term "are merely persuasive authority"); People v. Pestana, 762 N.Y.S.2d
786, 789 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 2003) (noting that a decision of an appellate term in not binding on
the supreme court of another department).
70 29 Holding Corp. v. Diaz, 775 N.Y.S.2d 807, 813 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2004) ("No authority
has been found suggesting that the Supreme Court is bound by decisions of the Appellate Term within
its own judicial department"); Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co. v. Village of Forestville, 294 N.Y.S.2d 59, 62
(Sup. Ct. Erie County 1968) ("A decision of an Appellate Term of one Judicial Department is not
binding upon the Supreme Court in another Department which has decided to the contrary").
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convenience; 71 in theory, the decision of any Department of the Appellate
Division is binding authority on all courts of original jurisdiction in the
state.72
The result of this allocation of appellate authority is to allow most
residential landlord-tenant issues to be resolved in a manner sensitive to
local conditions and individual circumstances. Because the reach of
binding appellate precedent in most landlord-tenant cases is so short, courts
in New York have been largely free to adapt their approach to residential
landlord-tenant disputes with the type of fact-sensitive balancing of equities
described in the previous Part. To be fair, the downstate Appellate Term
panels that have considered the issue since Holy Properties appeared to
have interpreted its applicability to residential leases in the same way as the
Rios court.73 But the availability of an appeal as of right to the Appellate
Division in a high-stakes action for rent has always posed a threat to the
lower courts' flexibility in this regard, 74 and in Rios that threat
materialized. Now, a single atypical case in an atypical procedural posture
will likely determine the substantive rights and duties of landlords and
tenants in residential leases throughout the state. Moreover, it will do so by
imposing a resolution crafted for the circumstances of a luxury residence in
perhaps the most expensive housing market in the country on a variety of
parties in qualitatively different situations. In short, this area of residential
landlord-tenant law is now governed throughout the state by rules designed
for the state's wealthiest citizens and interests. The next part of this Article
demonstrates just how problematic this outcome is by showing how
unusual the facts of Rios are when compared to the typical residential lease
in New York State.
71 Mountain View Coach Lines, Inc. v. Storms, 476 N.Y.S.2d 918, 919 (App. Div.-2d 1984)
(describing the framework of the Appellate Division); People v. Hill, 834 N.Y.S.2d 840, 845 (Crim. Ct.
N.Y. County 2007) (stating that the status of the Appellate Division justifies lower courts following
Appellate Division precedent).
72 Mountain View Coach Lines, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 919-20; Hill, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 845. In practice,
many courts of original jurisdiction appear to consider only the precedent of the Appellate Division
Department in which they sit to be binding, and treat precedent from other departments as persuasive
authority. 1 CARMODY-WAIT 2d, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 2:317 (2010).
73 See, e.g., Callender v. Titus, 791 N.Y.S.2d 868, 4 Misc.3d 126(A), (App. Term-2d & 11th Jud.
Dist. 2004); Commuter Hous. Co. v. Saunders, N.Y. L. J., Dec. 11, 2000, at 35 (N.Y. App. Term-9th &
10th Jud. Dist.); McMorrow v. Dorian, N.Y. L. J., Apr. 23, 1998, at 37 (N.Y. App. Term-2d & 11th Jud.
Dist.); Whitehouse Estates, Inc. v. Post 662 N.Y.S.2d 982 (App. Term-Ist 1997).
74 In particular, at least one court subject to review by the Appellate Term appears to have ignored
the latter court's application of Holy Properties to residential leases. Palumbo v. Donalds, 754
N.Y.S.2d 856 (Civ. Ct. Kings County 2003).
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III. A TALE OF Two CITIES: RICH LAW IN POOR COMMUNITIES
There are huge economic differences between the various communities
of New York City and of New York State, and these differences are
perhaps nowhere better reflected than in housing markets. Figure 1
demonstrated how atypical the Rios controversy was in the context of the
state's court system; the following charts demonstrate how atypical the
Rios parties' economic situation is in the context of the state's housing
markets.
FIGURE 2: MEDIAN HOUSING COSTS AS A FRACTION OF MEDIAN INCOME,
BY COUNTY 75
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Figure 2 demonstrates just how different the economic position of the
tenant in Rios is from the economic position of most residential tenants in
the state. The agreed rent in Rios was over three times the median housing
75 U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 64. Calculation of the monthly income was performed by the
author using ACS data and an Excel spreadsheet. An Excel spreadsheet with full data and calculations
is on file with the author.
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costs of a New York State household and roughly three times the median
housing costs in any downstate county. In fact, the agreed monthly rent in
Rios exceeds the median monthly income in the Bronx, nearly exceeds the
median monthly income in Brooklyn, and would consume over three-
quarters of the income of the median household in the state. To be blunt,
the tenant in Rios, whatever his troubles, was not confronted with the kind
of economic pressures most residential tenants in the state face. And given
courts' tendency to decide cases based at least in part on the economic
position of the parties, treating the disposition of an outlier case such as
Rios as a generally applicable rule is likely to be an ill fit for the vast
majority of landlord-tenant relationships throughout the state.
A fuller picture of the economic pressure on residential tenants in New
York can be obtained by looking beyond median incomes and housing
costs to the housing mix of communities throughout the state.
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FIGURE 3: FIRST AND SECOND DEPARTMENT HOUSING STOCK,
BY COUNTY 76












Figure 3 presents a comparison of residential households in each of the
counties in the First and Second Departments. It shows the number of
households that own versus the number that rent, and further differentiates
rental households under financial stress-defined as those spending more
than thirty percent of their household income on housing costs. As the
chart demonstrates, the urban counties of New York, Bronx, Kings, and
Queens each have more rental households than owner-occupied households
(vastly more in New York, Bronx, and Kings), while in the suburban
counties owner-occupied households outnumber rental households by as
much as four to one. Moreover, a far higher number and proportion of
households in the urban counties-which have lower incomes to begin







costs. There are more financially stressed rental households in each of
these counties than there are rental households in any other downstate
county, and more financially stressed households in Brooklyn alone than
there are total households in any of the lower Hudson Valley counties other
than Westchester. In short, the system of residential landlord-tenant law
has tremendous ramifications for the housing stability and economic well-
being of a large population concentrated in the urban counties of New York
City. But such legal rules are of far smaller impact-both in absolute terms
and as a proportion of the population-outside of those counties. Given the
historical willingness of courts to consider these economic stresses of urban
life in deciding residential tenant abandonment cases, the adoption of a
statewide bright-line rule based on the unusual economic circumstances of
the parties in Rios is a matter of serious concern for a large population that
was not represented before the Rios panel.
Finally, turning to the economic position of landlords, again we see wide
variation between urban and suburban communities.
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As Figure 4 demonstrates, despite having higher volumes of rental
housing, urban counties, in general have far tighter rental housing markets
than suburban counties. Thus we would expect there to be less justification
for protecting the income of landlords who leave an abandoned rental
property vacant in, for example, Brooklyn (Kings County) than in Staten
Island (Richmond County), given that in the former location the vastly
greater supply of rental housing7 8 does not appear to make it difficult to
find suitable tenants. In contrast, where rental housing markets are thinner
and demand is weaker (as in Richmond County in particular and the
suburban counties in general), forcing landlords to bear the costs of tenant
abandonment may be inappropriate.
The broad divergence of economic circumstances between the urban and
suburban counties of downstate New York alone suggests, given the
tendencies of courts to take such circumstances into account in tenant
abandonment cases, that a single, statewide, bright-line rule on a landlord's
duty to mitigate damages will be an ill fit for a significant number of
77 U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 64.
78 See fig. 3, supra.
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residential lease disputes. This is apparent even without looking to the
broad diversity of economic circumstances in the various urban, suburban,
and rural communities of upstate New York, and without taking into
account the individual equitable considerations that courts have looked to
in deciding whether to impose a duty to mitigate in a particular case. In
sum, settling the unsettled precedent on the issue of residential landlords'
duty to mitigate has brought consistency to an area of law that seemed-
based on the diversity of controversies and dispositions in reported cases-
well suited to a degree of inconsistency.
CONCLUSION: THE COSTS OF DOCTRINAL ERROR
This Article has focused on the consistency of Rios with trends in the
caselaw and its likely effects as precedent on the diverse communities of
New York State, but largely sidestepped the question of whether the
outcome of Rios was correct as a matter of doctrine rather than policy. In
fact, Rios is also a badly reasoned case. It rests on an incorrect-albeit
widely shared-interpretation of the Court of Appeals' decision in Holy
Properties. It is fitting, then, for this Article to conclude with an
explanation of that error and a discussion of its implications in light of the
analysis in the previous Parts.
The Rios panel reasoned that "the broad language employed and the
reliance on real property principles negate the possibility that the Court of
Appeals [in Holy Properties] was confining its determination only to
commercial leases. There is simply no basis for limiting the broad language
of [Holy Properties]."79 This pronouncement seems to ignore prominent
language in the Holy Properties Court's opinion:
Parties who engage in transactions based on prevailing law must
be able to rely on the stability of such precedents. In business
transactions, particularly, the certainty of settled rules is often
more important than whether the established rule is better than
another or even whether it is the 'correct' rule.so
The Rios court's implicit treatment of residential leases as "business
transactions" ignores a long history of legislative intervention in the market
for residential rental housing as well as the Court of Appeals' own
79 Rios v. Carrillo, 861 N.Y.S.2d 129, 130 (App. Div.-2d 2008).
80 Holy Properties Ltd., L.P. v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc., 87 N.Y.2d 130, 134 (1995) (emphasis
added).
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departures from traditional property law rules in the residential context.81
Given the fact that Holy Properties involved a commercial lease between
sophisticated parties for some of the most expensive commercial real estate
in New York City82 and the Court of Appeals' specific reference to
stability of expectations in business transactions, the Rios court's assertion
that there is "no basis" for limiting Holy Properties to commercial leases
seems dubious.
In defense of the Second Department panel in Rios, some other inferior
appellate courts appear to have made a similar error, and those courts bind
the relevant trial courts in the urban counties so strongly affected by the no-
mitigation rule. 83 Moreover, there may be arguments that the effects of
Rios are not terribly significant given the liberality with which state law
views the residential tenant's right to sublease and assign. 84 And of course,
there remains the question whether, whatever the default position on a
landlord's duty to mitigate, landlords and tenants would be able to contract
around the rule. 85 Still, the fact that all these courts have treated the issue as
81 See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 223-b, 226-b, 227-a, 227-c, 234, 235-b-f (Consol. 2011)
(creating rights unique to residential, as opposed to commercial, tenants); N.Y. CrTY ADMIN. CODE tit.
26, ch. 4. §§ 26-501 to 26-520 (2010) (describing rent stabilization); Garner v. Gerrish, 63 N.Y.2d 575,
577 (1984) (departing from the traditional rule that a lease made terminable at the will of the tenant
must also be terminable at the will of the landlord, in the context of a residential lease).
82 The premises that were the subject of the parties' lease in Holy Properties were in a "type A"
building located on 57h Street just off of 5th Avenue in midtown Manhattan, and the base rent agreed to
by the parties was over $300,000 per year in 1985 dollars. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 4-6, Holy
Properties Ltd., L.P. v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc., No. 1995-0520 (N.Y. App. Div.-1st Feb. 24, 1995),
1995 WL 17050827.
83 See supra notes 73-74 and sources cited therein.
84 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §226-b (Consol. 2011); Robert E. Parella, Real Property, 47
SYRACUSE L. REV. 681, 683-84 (1997). Of course, even this right will have differential value depending
on the ease with which a suitable sublessee or assignee can be found, and as discussed in Part III, supra,
the urban counties in which landlords would seem to have the weakest justification for leaving a rental
property vacant are also those in which a tenant is likely to face the least difficulty in finding a
substitute tenant. See supra table 4. Accordingly, treating R.P.L. §226-b as a rule-like substitute for
equitable weighing of the parties' economic positions and courses of conduct has the same effect as
treating the question of landlord mitigation as rule-like: it assumes an allocation of the costs of tenant
abandonment without regard to the particular facts and circumstances of an individual dispute.
85 Compare Holy Properties, 87 N.Y.2d at 134 (ruling that "the parties to a lease are not foreclosed
from contracting as they please."); with N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §226-b (Consol. 2011) (providing that
"[a]ny provision of a lease or rental agreement purporting to waive a provision of this section
[regulating the residential tenant's right to sublease or assign] is null and void."). Given the vastly
greater bargaining power of landlords in most residential leases, it is unlikely that tenants will be able to
bargain for a change to a pro-landlord default rule. Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential
Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 517, 583 (1984) (positing that
"[s]tandard form leases are usually drawn to appeal to the landlords who purchase such forms, and their
widespread use constitutes, in effect, a severe impediment to competition for renters on the basis of
different lease clauses . . . . The tenant seeking to modify such clauses thus faces heavy transaction and
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calling for a bright-line rule (rather than the flexible equitable standard that
seemed to prevail in past practice) will, in itself, mark a change in the
adjudication of tenant abandonment cases. And as discussed in Part II
above, to the extent that change is misguided, the injury it works will be
vastly compounded due to the weight of the Rios court's precedent. A
wrongly decided case will now bind not only the parties to the case itself,
and not only similarly situated parties in the same community, but all
residential landlords and tenants throughout the economically diverse state
of New York.
The change in residential landlord-tenant law worked by Rios was
unnecessary and regrettable. Formulating a single system of universal
bright-line rules to govern economic relationships in as diverse a
jurisdiction as New York is a questionable aspiration in general, and
particularly so with respect to housing, which has the peculiar quality of
being both highly variable and economically essential. The flexible
approach of courts in residential tenant abandonment cases prior to Rios
seemed to reflect at least a tacit or unconscious recognition that
individualized adjudication might be more appropriate than bright-line
rules, particularly in cases that involve the type of strong equitable interests
that arise with respect to housing. Nor is there any indication that this
somewhat uncertain system of equitable standards-based adjudication was
a particular burden to residential landlords and tenants or to the courts
themselves-what few cases arose in this area seemed to be ably disposed
of by courts based on a sensitive consideration of the totality of the parties'
circumstances.
In one sense, blame for the shift from flexible standards to bright-line
rules on the question of the duty to mitigate cannot be placed on the Rios
court-the duty to mitigate has always been discussed (if not implemented)
as if it were rule-based rather than standards-based. But viewed another
way, the shame of Rios is that the court failed to examine this shift or to
consider its implications in the context of a complex judicial hierarchy
overlaid on a diverse and populous jurisdiction-that it treated its task as
one of mechanically applying binding precedent rather than examining the
principles motivating the debate over an unsettled legal question. And
because it failed even at the task it set itself, the Rios court has worked a
significant change in the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants far
information costs and a practical absence of competition among landlords concerning the terms of such
clauses.").
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removed from the Second Department's courtroom-a change which is
likely to persist for some time to come.
